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THE DEBATE OVER ANNEXING TEXAS AND THE
EMERGENCE OF MANIFEST DESTINY
LYON RATHBUN

Scholars have long understood that the ideology of manifest destiny congealed out of the
millennial ideals embedded in American culture. However, they have not ful ly appre ciated that manifest destiny only became a national ideology by overwhelming the
arguments that were first voiced during the Monroe Administration to resist the incor poration of Texas into the Union. Understanding how the secular ideals of the classical
republican tradition were used to resist the inclusion of Texas can help us understand
the crystallization of manifest destiny into a theologized ideology in the 1840s.

A

ll students of American history are familiar with the astonishing burst of
expansion in the 1840s that began with the annexation of Texas and culminated in the huge territorial gains of the Mexican-American War. Fewer, however,
appreciate how vigorously many Americans sought to block expansion into the Far
West by opposing the annexation of Texas.
Opposition began in the early 1820s and crystallized into a movement led by
Conscience Whigs and abolitionists between 1836 and 1844. During these years,
opponents of annexation fervently warned that acquiring Texas would ignite war
with Mexico and set the nation on a path of empire building. Appealing to the civic
principles of the Revolutionary generation, opponents urged the nation to cultivate
the inner resources of the republic rather than pursue an expansionist policy that
would transform the nation into an empire. “We have a republic,” boomed Daniel
Webster in one of several orations he delivered denouncing annexation in 1844.
“Instead of aiming to enlarge its boundaries let us seek, rather, to strengthen its
union, to draw out its resources, to maintain and improve its institutions of religion
and liberty, and thus to rush it forward in its career of prosperity and glory.”1
Arguing that expanding slavery across the Southwest would corrupt the civic foundations of the republic, Whigs and abolitionists impeded expansionists in the
Jackson, Van Buren, and Tyler administrations from annexing Texas.
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Standard surveys of the nineteenth century typically depict westward expansion
as inevitable and unopposed. Even an historical overview as sensitive to the contradictory impulses of American culture as Eric Foner’s The Story of American Freedom
depicts white males of the antebellum period as broadly endorsing expansion.2 The
most recent and most nuanced histories of antebellum expansion make only passing reference to the activists who blocked the annexation of Texas until the election
of James Polk in 1844. Texas, after all, was annexed; the United States did become a
continental empire. The outcome of events has focused historical attention on the
causes and consequences of antebellum territorial expansion. Those who resisted
the seemingly inevitable march of the republic across the continent typically receive
little more than passing mention. 3
Not only living historians, but contemporaneous observers assumed that
expansion was problematic but inexorable, and therefore did not see opponents of
expansion as important players in events. Although Ralph Waldo Emerson himself
joined the petition campaign against the annexation of Texas, he wrote in his journal that “It is very certain that the strong British race which have now overrun so
much of this continent, must also overrun that tract [Texas] & Mexico & Oregon
also, and in the course of ages be of small import by what particular occasions &
methods it was done.”4 Likewise, the distinctive dynamism of American life left
Alexis de Tocqueville convinced that the United States would soon acquire
Mexico’s northern territories. In Democracy in America, Tocqueville observed that
the “vast provinces extending beyond the frontiers of the Union towards Mexico
are still destitute of inhabitants.” Inevitably, American citizens would expand
across the northern Mexican territories. “They will take possession of the soil and
establish social institutions, so that when the legal owner at length arrives, he will
find the wilderness under cultivation, and strangers quietly settled in the midst of
his inheritance.”5
Notably, Tocqueville saw the apparent inevitability of American expansion as a
cause for alarm rather than celebration. “The Americans contemplate this extraordinary and hasty progress with exultation,” he wrote, “but they would be wiser to consider it with sorrow and alarm.”6 Tocqueville, however, wrote these words before the
debate over annexing Texas had complicated the issue of territorial expansion. He
never heard the bull whip of John Quincy Adams’s oratory cracking across the floor
of the House of Representatives; he never saw the mountain of petitions, both for
and against the annexation of Texas, dumped by the wagon load in the capital; he
never read the dire warnings in the Whig and abolitionist press that seizing the territories of a sister republic would transform the United States into a new version of
the Roman Empire. Had Alexis de Tocqueville witnessed the national debate over the
annexation of Texas between 1836 and 1844, he would have heard abundant expressions of “sorrow and alarm.”
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Contemporaneous observers ,l i ke contemporary histori a n s ,h ave had ample cause
for focusing on the seeming inevitability of expansion in the 1840s. Yet to overlook
the opponents of annexation because they were fighting a battle that seemed
doomed even to themselves is to flatten our understanding of the very dynamics that
did, finally, result in the annexation of the Far West during Polk’s administration.
Appreciating the arguments used to resist the incorporation of Texas into the Union
can help us understand why manifest destiny emerged with such concentrated intensity during the heady days of Polk’s administration. In a more generalized sense, the
national controversy over annexing Texas is worth revisiting because it mirrors how
conflicted Americans of the antebellum period actually were over their political heritage and over their collective future.

THE POLEMICAL REVIVAL OF

THE

OLD SPARTAN ETHOS

The question of admitting Texas to the Union emerged within a political climate of
deepening national discord over slavery. The impasse over admitting Missouri as a
slave state back in 1820 had been a watershed in the emerging polarization between
North and South; another defining moment had been the confrontation over South
Carolina’s effort to nullify tariff rates in 1832. Tensions had intensified in the wake of
the Turner slave revolt and the British abolition of slavery in the West Indies; the militant American Anti-Slavery Society was formed in 1833; efforts to distribute antislavery literature in the South were blocked through violence and intimidation; the
petition campaign to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia prompted the
Pinckney gag rule that prevented members of the House from receiving anti-slave
petitions and from debating any issue connected with slavery. The claustrophobic
defensiveness felt by many Southerners grew increasingly brittle when Andrew
Jackson anointed the moderate New Yorker Martin Van Buren to lead the Democratic
ticket in the presidential election of 1836.7
In the spring of 1836, as divisions over a complex of issues concerning slavery
were deepening, the emergence of a new controversy, whether to add Texas to the
Union, added grease to a fire that was already crackling hot. In March 1836, Texas
had declared independence from Mexico; in April, Sam Houston had defeated Santa
Anna’s army at San Jacinto; in May 1836, while the House was debating the gag rule
and the Senate was considering federal measures to block “incendiary” literature
from being sent through the U.S. mail, both houses began considering petitions
calling for the recognition and annexation of Texas.8 Abolitionists and Conscience
Whigs had a new, immensely provocative, Jacksonian initiative to oppose.
The debate that began in 1836 over annexing Texas added a new element to the
array of disagreements over slavery that were intensifying in the late 1830s. The
debate was also the culmination of sectional differences over expanding slavery into
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the Southwest that had first erupted a g eneration earlier over terms of the AdamsOnís Transcontinental Treaty of 1819. How national leaders began differing over
the expansion of slavery in 1820 is critical for understanding the debate over Texas
that began in 1836.
While ratifying American sovereignty over Florida, the Trans-continental Treaty
had also relinquished all American claims to the southwestern territories west of the
Sabine River, a measure that deeply threatened many Southerners. While the 1819
treaty blocked Southern expansion into the Southwest, the Compromise of 1820
excluded slavery north of latitude 36º 30’, the southern boundary of Missouri. Many
Southerners responded with a pronounced sense of entrapment.9 Before 1820, John
Calhoun, Andrew Jackson, and John Quincy Adams had all embraced Jefferson’s
vision of the Empire of Liberty spreading across the continent, “doubling the numbers of mankind, and of course the quantum of existence and happiness.”10 After
the Missouri Compromise was forged and the Transcontinental Treaty ratified,
these three national leaders began developing their mutually antagonistic visions of
the nation’s future. Deeply felt differences over Texas were decisive in shattering the
consensus that had united Republicans in the wake of the War of 1812.
In the teens, Americans were finding common ground in the core principles of
the “American System” promoted by the National Republicans: Through the integrated development of agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce, fueled by incremental expansion across the continent, the country would become economically
self-sufficient, as Hamilton had desired, while maintaining the moderate level of
development that Jefferson had hoped to preserve.11 As Hezekiah Niles explained in
an 1817 editorial, agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce were all necessary for
the nation’s prosperity. “The three,” Niles wrote, “in certain and just proportions,
must exist to render and keep us a free, happy and prosperous people.”12
Notably, the National Republicans were helping to legitimize the commercialized
civic faith that so many Americans were embracing in the teens. The commonwealth would not find its social cohesion through the promotion of civic virtue, as
members of the Revolutionary generation had advocated, but in the collective
opportunities for private gain created by a nationally integrated market system.
During a speech endorsing internal improvements delivered on February 4, 1817,
John Calhoun epitomized the National Republicans’ faith in state-directed private
enterprise when he stated, “Let us, then, bind the republic together with a perfect
system of roads and canals. Let us conquer space.”13
For a brief period in the t eens, future enemies united around a commercialized
vision of national development and expansion that was commonly eulogized as a
fulfillment of the nation’s providential destiny. In helping extend the natio n’s border to the Pacific, Adams saw himself as an agent of destiny. After negotiating the
final terms of the Transcontinental Treaty, Adams w rote in his diary, “It was near
one in the morning when I closed the day with ejaculations of fervent gratitude to
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the giver of all good. . . . It [the treaty] is the work of an intelligent and all-embracing Cause.”14 For his part, in defeating the Creeks and Seminoles during the War of
1812, and in effecting the removal of the Civilized Tribes west of the Mississippi
during his presidency, Jackson was a veritable embodiment of the divinely sanctioned mission to expand across the continent.15 The commitment to territorial
expansion that Adams shared with Jackson was underscored when the refined New
Englander defended the rough-hewn Tennessean for his audacious 1818 Florida
invasion. But this was before Jackson, and other Southerners, began accusing
Adams of “giving away Texas” while negotiating the Adams-Onís Transcontinental
Treaty of 1819.
The Adams-Onís Treaty had been negotiated around a simple formula: On the
one hand, American claims on the Columbia River and Pacific Coast would be safeguarded and American neutrality in the Spanish colonial conflict would remain
intact. On the other hand, the United States would surrender all territorial claims
west of the Sabine River while Spain would surrender all claims east of the
Mississippi.16 At the time, Adams believed that relinquishing the country’s dubious
claim to the Southwest was temporary. The very territorial gains won through the
treaty, Adams assured the cabinet in November 1819, “rendered it still more
unavoidable that the remainder of the continent should ultimately be ours.”17
Seeking to realize his vision of continental expansion as president, Adams himself sought to purchase Texas from Mexico. Yet at the same time, the impasse over
admitting Missouri as a free state had left him apprehensive about adding territory
to the Union that would augment the power of the South in the national government. Adam’s vision of national progress had presumed that slavery would gradually disappear in the South, as it had in the North after the Revolutionary War.18
However, the Missouri crisis had demonstrated that Southerners were determined
to protect slavery, even at the cost of seceding from the Union.19 At the time of the
Missouri Compromise, Adams wondered in his diary if Northerners should not
have stood their ground over slavery in Missouri. This would have forced a showdown with the slave states and resulted in a new union of free Northern states.“If
the Union must be dissolved,” Adams concluded, “slavery is precisely the question
upon which it ought to break. For the present,however, this contest is laid asleep.”20
The Missouri crisis had convinced Adams that only a cataclysmic confrontation
could eliminate slavery; it had also left him fearful that expanding slavery would
hasten the awful day of reckoning.
Before the Missouri crisis, Adams had seen no internal obstacles to the expansion
of the nation to the Pacific. Yet afterwards, Adams saw the acquisition of Texas as
endangering the Union. In April 1820, Adams wrote that the nation was threatened
by the combination of “the overgrown extent of its territory and the slavery question.”
By reviving the slavery issue, acquiring Texas might “split us in two.”21 As Adams’s
vision of expanding the nation to the Pacific had been expressed in the language of
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providential destiny, so his emerging doubts echoed the classical warning that as
republics expanded, internal differences made civic dissolution increasingly likely.
Others began expressing the same fear of national fragmentation in similar terms.
In the fall of 1819, Monroe’s cabinet had belligerently considered occupying
Texas if Spain continued to withhold its ratification. Yet after the Missouri crisis,
Monroe warned that acquiring more “territory, to the west & south, involve[d] difficulties, of an internal nature, which menace[d] the Union itself.”22 In 1836, Adams
would explain that President Monroe had favored the Sabine River as the nation’s
southwestern boundary in 1819 because “more expansive borders would make our
Union so heavy that it would break into fragments by its own weight.”23 Dropping
the trope of providential destiny, Monroe,as remembered by Adams,had embraced
the language of classical republicanism: republics could not expand without selfdestructing.
For some,the prospect of adding Texas to the Union had revived old secular fears
that republics could not expand beyond finite limits. For others, particularly from
southwestern states like Tennessee and Kentucky, abandoning Texas betrayed the
country’s providential future. In 1820, Henry Clay introduced legislation that
would annul the Transcontinental Treaty. Echoing editorials across the West that
denounced the treaty for giving up Texas, he explained that it was “in the order of
providence and an inevitable result of the principle of population that the whole of
this continent, including Texas, was to be peopled in process of time.”24 “The magnificent valley of the Mississippi is ours,” declared Senator Thomas Hart B enton in
one of several editorials he wrote denouncing the cession of Texas, “and woe to the
statesman who shall undertake to surrender one drop of its water, one inch of its
soil, to any foreign power.”25
After 1820,national leaders no longer agreed that acquiring Texas, along with the
whole western half of the continent, was ne cessary to achieve integrated national
development. While some continued using the language of providential destiny in
calling for the acquisition of Texas, others had begun echoing the civic vocabulary
of classical republicanism in expressing their fears of social disintegration. The
emerging division over slavery had given new saliency to the old Montesquieuian
warning that diverging interests within an expansive republic made its dissolution
inevitable.
We can easily forget that the generation of Adams, Clay, and Jackson came to
political consciousness in the 1780s, when Montesquieu’s conception of republics
still dominated American political thought. During his youth, Andrew Jackson had
involved himself in secessionist intrigue in Tennessee and later supported the Burr
conspiracy. As an undergraduate at Harvard, John Quincy Adams was swayed, for a
brief time, by the Anti-Federalist critique of the federal Constitution.26 As recently
as 1786, Jefferson himself had assumed that territories west of the Appalachian
Mountains would become autonomous republics as they developed distinctive
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social habits and economic interests. “If they see their interests in separation,”
Jefferson wrote of Kentuckians in 1786,“why should we take sides with our Atlantic
rather than our Mississippi descendants? God bless them both and keep them in
union, if it be for their good, but separate from them, if it be better.”27 Jefferson’s
implicit assumption that republics could not expand beyond finite limits had
undergirded the Articles of Confederation and became a key tenet of the AntiFederalist opposition to the Federal Constitution. As Samuel Beer writes in To Make
a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism, “It was Montesquieu’s model of
the confederate republic, set in its larger intellectual context, that gave coherence to
the argument of the Anti-Federalists.”28 For the Anti-Federalists, only small
republics could be assured of representation by virtuous leaders who would retain
their ties to local communities. Of course, ratification of the Constitution in 1787
had discredited the Montesquieuian republican vision. The new institutional
framework rendered federalism a workable mechanism for making territorial
expansion compatible with republican government.29
Jefferson, and expansionists who followed his lead throughout the antebellum
period, grounded their providential vision of territorial enlargement in the new
institutional framework provided by the Federal Constitution. Notably, the three
authors of The Federalist Papers, John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton,
collectively signed these polemics with the name “Publius” after the founder of
Rome immortalized by Plutarch in Life of Publius Valerius Publicola.30 They deliberately associated the new constitution with the dynamic of Rome as opposed to the
inertia of Sparta that had char acterized the Articles of Confederation.
In contrast to the Anti-Federalists, supporters of the Constitution believed that
expansion could stabilize the civic foundations of the new nation. In his famous
“Federalist Number Ten,” Madison-Publius explained the central dynamic of the new
Constitution. Because the new framework would be rooted in the sovereignty of citizens, not of states, regional and national concerns would harmonize as the population and territory of the republic expanded. What had been a threat under the Spartan
Articles of Confederation was a blessing in the new expansive republic. As Madison
put it, “In the extent and proper structure of the Union,therefore we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.”31
With the demise of the Articles of Confederation, the classical republican heritage
had lost its institutional base. Nevertheless, the Montesquieuian view that republics
had to remain territorially limited remained a vibrant thread within the tapestry of
traditions comprising the political culture of the United States. It helped buttress the
states’ rights position that South Carolina advanced during the nullification crisis
and that would eventually rationalize the secession of the South in 1860. Calhoun’s
theory that the Constitution was essentially a contract between the states drew
directly on Montesquieu’s idea of confederated republics in which secession was a
fully acknowledged right.32 Montesquieu’s “Spartan” version of republican doctrine
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also provided a familiar vocabulary for comprehending the vexing sectional divisions that began threatening to fragment the republic in the 1820’s. That vocabulary
would prove rhetorically expedient for blocking the efforts to annex Texas that began
in 1836.

THE OPPONENTS SEIZE

THE

REIGNS

By the 1830s, the federal framework was well established and leaders across the
political sp ectrum had been eulogizing the promise of territorial expansion since
the opening of the new century. Why, then, did opponents of annexation resurrect
the seemingly outmoded allegation that adding new territory would overextend the
nation’s boundaries? Because the claim added resonance to the Whig charge that
Jackson posed a despotic threat to the civic foundations of the republic. In contrast
to the ideological contests between Federalists and Republicans,the emerging competition between the Jacksonian and Whig parties, played out before a vastly
increased national audience,was much more figural in nature.33 As Jackson had elevated himself into a national symbol of yeoman virtue protecting the nation from
aristocratic domination,so Jackson’s disparate foes were finding their own symbolic
identity as defenders of the revolutionary heritage against the threat of executive
tyranny. The Whigs did not congeal into a national party until the election of 1840.
Since the battle over rechartering the Second Bank of the United States, Jackson’s
deeply divided political foes had united around the symbolic ideal of preserving
republican liberty from executive tyranny. They found common ground in the
claim that Jackson was consolidating federal power in the executive branch of government.34 The 1834 New York Whig Convention was echoing this charge in its
shrill announcement that “OUR LIBERTIES ARE IN DANGER at this moment. If
by your votes you concede the powers that are claimed, your president has become
your monarch.”35
Following the shrewd council of his advisors, Jackson refused to take any action
towards Texas in the culminating year of his presidency that could tarnish his image
as an icon of republican liberty or damage the prospects of his successor in the
upcoming election of 1836. He would not risk giving his ardent critics any pretext
for embellishing the rallying cry of the emerging Whig Party that “King Andrew”
was bent on consolidating the powers of the government in the executive branch,
undermining the liberties of the people,and wrecking the republic. Considering his
longstanding desire to add Texas to the Union, Jackson’s restraint in 1836 was
remarkable.
Of all the national figures who had opposed the Transcontinental Treaty, none
had been more convinced than Andrew Jackson that the western boundaries of the
Louisiana Purchase extended, at least, to the headwaters of the Rio Grande River.
Early in his first administration, he wrote Van Buren, “The god of the universe had
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intended this great valley to belong to one nation.”36 Significantly, Jackson did not
pursue Texas primarily to expand slavery but to fulfill the vision of national development that he had shared with Clay, Calhoun, and Adams in the teens.37 Expressing
his ardent desire to realize the ambitions for empire that Jefferson and John Quincy
Adams had done so much to initiate, he wrote shortly after taking office,“I have long
since been aware of the importance of Texas to the United States, and of the real
necessity of extending our boundary west of the Sabine. . . . I shall keep my eye on
this object and the first propitious moment make the attempt to regain the Territory
as far south and west as the great Desert.”38 Having failed to purchase Texas during
the first seven years of his presidency, Jackson was given a new opportunity when
Texas won its independence from Mexico during the last year of his presidency.
Jackson’s critics, however, were making the cost of action prohibitively high.
In the same months that Texas was separating from Mexico, the abolitionist
activist Benjamin Lundy was disseminating a volley of electrifying polemics that
provided Jackson’s critics with all the materials they needed to formulate a powerful new territorial dimension to their Whig critique of Jacksonianism.
Born in 1789, Benjamin Lundy was a fourth generation Quaker who became
devoted to the abolitionist cause after serving an apprenticeship as a saddler in
Wheeling, Virginia.39 In 1815, after opening a saddle shop in St. Clairsville, Ohio,
Lundy organized his first antislavery association, the Union Humane Society, that
became a model for the nearly 1000 antislavery societies that began agitating to prevent Texas from being annexed to the Union in 1836.40 In the mid-1820s, Lundy had
attempted to establish Negro settlements in Canada and Haiti where emancipated
slaves, in possession of their political rights, could demonstrate their innate capacity for full civic existence. By 1828, Lundy began viewing Texas as an ideal locale for
a Negro settlement.
After an initial visit to Texas in 1828, Lundy wrote that under Mexican rule, Texas
was a region “where man, without distinction of color or condition, is looked upon
as the being that the Deity made him, free and independent.”41 A thr iving Texan
colony of emancipated slaves, Lundy wrote in another issue, would prove to
Americans that the man of color, “may be fitted for freedom and self-g overnment
with perfect ease and safety.”42
After three trips and three years of effort, Benjamin Lundy finally received an
empresario grant for a colony from the governor of Tamaulipas in the spring of
1835. Allowed 138,000 acres,the exact location to be selected by himself, Lundy was
permitted to settle 250 families within two years. 43 When the eruption of hostilities
in Texas rendered his colonization plans unfeasible, Benjamin Lundy returned to
the United States convinced that the Texan rebellion posed a dire threat to the
future of the republic.
Lundy condemned the Texan Rebellion in a barrage of nine essays first published
in the National Gazette and later republished in a pamphlet titled The Origin and
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True Causes of the Texas Revolution Commenced in the Year 1835. In an expanded
version this became The War in Texas: A Review of Facts and Circumstances, Showing
That this Contest is the Result of a Long Premeditated Crusade against the
Government, Set on Foot by Slaveholders, Land Speculators, etc. with the View of ReEstablishing, Extending,and Perpetuating the System of Slavery and the Slave Trade in
the Republic of Mexico. The culmination of Lundy’s enchantment with the harmony
between Hispanics, Blacks, Indians, and Anglos that he had witnessed in northern
Mexico, The War in Texas became a primary source for the Whig and abolitionist
opposition to annexation over the course of the next nine years.
Historians of the Whig Party and abolitionist movement have often pointed out
that antebellum reformers, influenced by the Second Great Awakening, and by
Scottish common sense philosophy, emphasized absolutist moral appeals in their
rhetoric.44 Benjamin Lundy’s polemical w ritings were embroidered with Christian
imagery and infused with an absolutist ethos of moral certainty. Yet Lundy’s argument against the annexation of Texas was grounded in classical republican doctrine
rather than in strictly religious or moral principle. The War in Texas asserted that
appropriating Texas would wreck the secular foundation of the republic. As an
organic entit y, the republic would implode if an active citizenry did not maintain
the institutional balances that alone insured political stability. Lundy explained,
We cannot longer disguise the fact that the advocates of slavery are resolved,at all hazards to obtain the territory in question, if possible, for the avowed purpose of adding
five or six more slaveholding states to this union. Let it be duly considered and let the
public voice, from every quarter of the republic, denounce in tones of thunder, the
unhallowed proceeding. It must be borne in mind that the system of slavery has been
abolished in Texas, by the Mexican government. It is now a free state. A GREATER
CURSE could scarcely befall our country, than the annexation of that immense territory to this republic,if the system of slavery should likewise be re-established there.

The “curse” that Lundy invokes is not biblical, but civic: the acquisition of Texas
would put the nation under the “yoke” of one faction, the slaveocracy, that would
subordinate other interests within the republic. “The hope is entertained,” Lundy
explained fervently,
That the efforts of the Mexicans may be thus paralyzed,and the possession of the territory retained by the revolutionists until the next meeting of the congress of the
United States, when the independence of the Texian [sic]Republic may be formally
acknowledged that soon thereafter admitted, as an independent state, into this confederacy. This “The Combination” is fully determined upon. It is the ultimatum of
their grand design. Its members have a majority in the councils of the nation; and as
the sentiments of the e xecutive head coincides with theirs, the g overnment is com-
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pletely under their controlling influence; and their object will certainly be accomplished,unless the people of our free states arouse from their apathy and by an open,
decided expression o f their sentiments, induce their senators and representatives in
congress to oppose this measure. LET THE PUBLIC VOICE BE RAISED IN TONES
OF THUNDER . . . . Let the nation be thoroughly awakened,and all may yet be well.
Otherwise, the Demon of Oppression will triumph, and our children must wear his
chains—or blood will flow in torrents,and the land will be drenched with their crimson gore.

The language, charged with Christian imagery, is explicitly employed to make a
civic claim: appropriating Mexico’s northern territories would barbarize the
American citizenry and transform the republic into a despotic empire. “Will you
sanction the abominable outrage?” Lundy asked, concluding The War in Texas,
“involve yourselves in the deep criminality, and perhaps the horrors of war, for the
establishment of slavery in a land of freedom? And thus put your neck and the necks
of your posterity under the feet of the domineering t yrants of the South for centuries to come?”45
Lundy’s sense of righteous urgency, and his civic claim that annexing Texas
would undermine the secular foundation of the republic, were taken up by opponents everywhere. On March 18, 1836, a leading Whig paper, The National
Intelligencer, echoed Lundy in claiming that the “plot” to acquire Texas would be “a
deep and lasting curse to the country.” In Congress, John Quincy Adams acted on
Lundy’s call to oppose the incipient efforts to annex Texas. He did so in a famous
speech, “On the Joint Resolution for Distributing Rations to the Distressed
Fugitives from Indian Hostilities,” delivered before the House of Representatives on
May 25,1836. Adams used the speech both to refute the first article of the Pinckney
gag rule, that Congress possessed no authority over slavery in the states, and to
advance Lundy’s claim that expanding slavery imperiled the civic foundations of the
republic. Because it was so widely reproduced both in Mexico and in the abolitionist press, Adams described the speech in his diary as “by far the most noted speech
that I ever made”46
Turning from other issues to Texas, Adams echoed Lundy in transforming
Mexico into a symbol of freedom while transmuting Texas into an emblem of
despotism. “The war now raging in Texas,” Adams charged,
is a war f or the re-establishment of slavery where it was abolished . . . and every possible effort has been made to drive us into the war on the side of slavery. What will be
your claim in the upcoming war with Mexico? Aggression, conquest,and the re-establishment of slavery where it has been abolished. In that war, sir, the banners of freedom will be the banners of Mexico;and your banners,I blush to speak the word, will
be the banners of slavery.47
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In advancing his provocative assertion, Adams was relying—directly—on the overheated evidence that Benjamin Lundy had accumulated during his three excursions
into Texas and Tamaulipas. Adams had met Lundy in 1835 and read many of his
articles before recognition became an issue for congressional debate. Shortly after
Adams began making his arguments in the House, he thanked Lundy for supplying
him “with nearly all the facts” he had employed in the congressional debates.48 One
month later, Adams confided to Lundy, “I see no alternative, but that the whole
Mexican confederation is destined to be overrun by our landjobbers and slavemakers, and that the dissolution of our own Union must precede the final struggle
between slavery and freedom.”49
By highlighting the abolishment of slavery in Mexico, Adams underscored the
maleficence of annexing Texas. Yet in defending Mexico’s civic integrity, Adams also
denounced Jacksonian expansion as threatening to overextend the republic’s
boundaries. Explaining that Monroe had favored the Sabine River as the nation’s
southwestern boundary so as not to over-expand the boundaries of the republic,
Adams asked his fellow congressmen,
As to the annexation of Texas to your confederation, for what do you want it? Are you
not large and unwieldy enough already? . . . Is your Southern and South-Western frontier not sufficiently extensive? Why are you adding regiment after regiment of dragoons to your standing army?50

Colleagues who had seen Secretary of State Adams set the nation on a diplomatic
course of continental expansion must have listened to Adams with incredulity. Yet
however hypocritical or outmoded Adams’ argument might have appeared to his
listeners, it was a rhetorically effective means of linking Jackson’s desire to acquire
Texas with earlie r Whig efforts to depict Jackson as threatening the underpinnings
of the republic. And indeed, Whig efforts to discredit expansionistic aspirations
were effecting Jackson’s response to the unfolding events in Texas.
Throughout the months leading up to the 1836 election, Jackson reacted to
events in Texas with extraordinary caution. Privately, Jackson itched to deal with
Mexico as he had with the Seminole Indians. Informed during a cabinet meeting
that Mexican officials were intimidating American residents at Tampico, he heatedly
ordered a letter written to the local Naval commander with instructions, in the
event that any American citizens were harmed, “to batter down and destroy their
town and exterminate the inhabitants from the face of the earth.”51 Yet Jackson did
not dare act. In July 1836, a delegation of Texan commissioners arrived in
Washington to lobby for American recognition of Texan independence. Though
“favorably disposed” to their objectives, Jackson would not take any action as president, “lest the censures of the world, or at least the civilized world, might fall upon
him.”52
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Throughout this period, Jackson was judiciously heeding the council of advisors
who cautioned him to take no action regarding Texas that could be used by his political opponents. During the Texan Revolution, General Gains, commander of
American forces along the boarder between the United States and Mexico, violated his
ambiguous orders to respect neutrality. Frank Blair, his eye focused on public opinion, informed Jackson that Gaines was “bringing upon our character as a people the
infamy of the Carthagenians.”53 Amos Kendall, also making direct reference to pubic
opinion, implored Jackson to recall Gaines from the border. Kendall explained, “I
would wish our government to maintain such an attitude as not only to be right but
to appear so before the world. Our people are already considered responsible for the
warfare carried on against Mexico in Texas, and that sentiment will gain stren g t h ,d ay
by day throughout the world.” Jackson immediately saw the wisdom of avoiding public censure and informed Kendall that his was “certainly a just view, and one which
you will find I have adopted. I have determined to maintain a strict neutrality.”54
Suggesting his sensitivity to charges of exercising executive despotism, Jackson
conspicuously left Congress with the prerogative of recognizing Texas. “I think it
most congenial with the principles of our government,” he wrote in December 1836,
“to leave the question to Congress, as the proper power, being in session to advise,
upon the propriety of acknowledging the independence of Texas.”55 Determined to
remain a national icon of republican principle, he would not risk energizing his
critics by recognizing Texas.
As the issue of Texas emerged onto the national stage, Benjamin Lundy’s War in
Texas enabled opponents to characterize annexation as dangerous to the civic foundations of the republic. In the antiquated but familiar language of republican doctrine, opponents of annexation gave voice to Northern anxieties that acquiring
Texas would give the South disproportionate political strength in the federal government. Jacksonians would have to saturate the national culture with the transcendent creed of manifest destiny to muffle their opponents’ civic arguments.
Between 1836 and 1844, opponents of annexation resorted to a wide spectrum
of arguments that appealed to differing constituencies, interests, and values. Many
abolitionists focused on the immorality of slavery; some Whigs, and Democrats,
argued that incorporating the “Anglo-Gallo-Americans” of the Southwest would
threaten the integrity of Anglo-Saxon culture; others insisted the Constitution
offered no provisions for incorporating a foreign people; still others maintained
that the Northeast, or Southeast, would lose population and economic leverage if
Texas joined the Union.56 While these appeals were compelling in local contexts,the
argument that resonated most deeply in the collective political conscience of
Americans was the charge that acquiring Texas was not merely immoral, impolitic,
or unconstitutional: Annexing Texas would imperil the republic itself.
Appealing to the old Montesquieuian tradition, opponents of annexation repeatedly invoked the antithesis between Spartan consolidation and Roman conquest.
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Again and again, polemicists emphasized the need to fortify and embellish rather
than expand and accumulate; they insisted that the republic had no divine protection against the corrosion of time; they warned that expansion would multiply
external enemies while creating extremes of privilege and dependence within.
Robert Mayo’s 1839 pamphlet, Political Sketches of Eight Years in Washington,
illustrates how opponents of annexation employed Montesquieuian appeals to
resist the annexation of Texas. By encouraging the Texan rebellion, Mayo insisted
that Jackson had already corrupted the republic’s civic foundations. “Your boasted
masterpiece of political systems,” Mayo wrote in his introduction, “has already far
degenerated into the deplorable condition of a practical revolution which but too
probably shadows forth the reality of the coming catastrophe that threatens speedily to manifest itself to every eye.”57 Mayo shrilly warned that if the republic dared
to seize Mexican territory, the impending ruin of the United States would be complete. The conspiracy to “dismember the Mexican dominions” would “pervert the
sacred name and principles of republicans, to the private pur poses of peculation,
power and self.”58 Acquiring Texas would violate Mexican sovereignty, overextend
the borders, swell the army, increase political patronage, and augment executive
power. In short, the annexation of Texas would wreck the republic.
Using a strikingly classical metaphor, Mayo warned that conquering Mexican
lands would quicken the turning wheel of fortune that dictated the fate of all human
societies. Having put too much faith in perfidious public servants, Americans were,
“CAREERING THE CYCLE OF POLITICAL DESTINY WHICH AUTHENTIC
HISTORY ASCRIBES TO ALL NATIONS OF A MORNING’S DAWN, A MERIDIAN RENOWN, AND AN EVENING’S DECLINATION TOWARDS THE
GLOOMY ABYSS FROM WHENCE THEY EMERGED.”59 According to Mayo,
acquiring Mexican territories would take the United States down the wretched
decline of empire-building.
The classical premises that Mayo employed in Political Sketches were echoed
across the polemical literature written in opposition to the annexation of Texas.
Even Church-affiliated polemicists usually cast their arguments in explicitly classical terms.One of the best known pamphlets, widely distributed in the United States
and Mexico, was written in 1837 by the prominent Unitarian minister William
Channing. Titled “Letter to the Hon. Henry Clay, on the Annexation of Texas to the
United States,” Channing’s epistolary manifesto made a clarion appeal to the same
classical suppositions that are so evident in Mayo’s and Lundy’s writings.
For Channing, as for Mayo, the annexation of Texas portended the ruin of the
American republic. Seizing Texas, Channing warned, “will be linked by an iron
necessity to long-continued deeds of rapine and blood. Ages may not see the catastrophe of the tragedy, the first scene of which we are so ready to enact.”60 If the
republic had learned from history, “it would feel the necessity of laying an immediate curb on its passion for extended territory. It would not trust itself to new acqui-
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sitions. It would shrink from the temptation to conquest.”61 The annexation of
Texas, Channing warned, would precipitate the same consequences of empirebuilding dramatized in so many modern and ancient histories of republics.
For Channing, the consequence of violating Mexico’s sovereignty would be civic
ruin. “Great armies will require great revenues and raise up great chieftains. Are we
tired of freedom, that we are prepared to place it under such guardians? Is the
republic bent on dying by its own hands?”62 The annexation of Texas would transmogrify the republic into an empire.
No public figure was more passionat ely opposed to annexing Texas than John
Quincy Adams. Adams had launched his own campaign against the annexation of
Texas in his 1836 speech “On the Joint Resolution for Distributing Rations to the
Distressed Fugitives from Indian Hostilities.” When the 25th Congress began deliberations in December 1837, Adams presented a package of petitions protesting
annexation. He also presented petitions of the recently organized New York Peace
Society to establish an international Court of Nations where the outstanding differences between Mexico and the United States could be arbitrated.63 When the
administration majority voted to table the anti-Texas resolutions, the House was
inundated with a flo od of new petitions against the “annexation of foreign territories of immense and unknown extent for the purpose of encouraging the propagation of slavery.”64 The state legislatures of Rhode Island, Vermont, Michigan, Ohio,
and Massa chusetts delivered to the House more resolutions denouncing annexation. In response, Tennessee, Alabama, and other Southern states presented the
House with memorials endorsing the annexation of Texas.65
By June 1838, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs recommended that all
petitions and resol utions for and against annexation be tabled. The motion, however, did not impede Adams. During the three weeks that Congress remained in session, Adams held the floor during the morning hour reserved for Foreign Affairs
Committee business. His marathon speech condemned the tabling of petitions and
the conspiracy to seize Mexico’s northern provinces. The pamphlet compiled from
the daily fragments of his three week speech filled 130 pages of small print.66 By the
end of the 25th Congress, Adams and his abolitionist allies had made the political
cost of supporting annexation so high that Van Buren could not be persuaded to
support the cause. Preoccupied with economic depression, and fearful that annexation would precipitate a war with Mexico, Van Buren repudiated persistent Texan
demands for annexation.67 In October 1838, the Texas delegation in Washington
formally withdrew its proposal for annexation.68

TYLER’S BID FOR TEXAS
Soon after John Tyler became president in April 1841,he began seeking the dubious
glory of annexing the Lone Star Republic. Though a strong partisan for Southern
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interests, Tyler still saw territorial expansion as an economic imperative for the
whole country. The ongoing economic depression that had begun with the banking
crisis of 1837 had convinced Tyler that opening new territories and a cquiring new
markets were necessary to sustain national economic growth into the foreseeable
future.
As Tyler renewed efforts to acquire Texas, thousands of Americans ruined in the
economic downturn were beginning to covet the untapped resources of the Far West.
A plethora of new travel narratives such as The Personal Narrative of James O. Pattie
(1832) and Albert Pike’s Prose Sketches and Poems Written in the Western Country
(1834) were bringing the Far West to the attention of American readers. These narratives, glorifying the presumed superiority of Anglo-Saxons over other races, did
much to popularize the cultural ideals of Romanticism that were leaving many
Americans increasingly receptive to the transcendent claims of manifest destiny.
While the Great Plains and Rockies inhibited agrarian expansion between the 1820s
and 1840s, a wide assortment of writings depicting the Far West would help promote
the great wave of western settlement that took place between the mid-forties and the
mid-nineties.69
George Bancroft’s History of the United States, grounded in the motifs of
Romanticism rather than the imperatives of Republicanism, legitimized the ideal of
territorial expansion in the phrase embossed across the spine of every volume,
“Westward the course of empire holds its sway.” Although earlier histories of the
United States had been published, Bancroft’s History was the first to find a wide
readership.70 Bancroft explained, in the introduction to the first volume, that his
history revealed how the Divine Will was enfolded within the historical development of the American nation.“It is the object of the present work,” Bancroft wrote,
“to follow the steps by which a favoring Providence, calling our institutions into
being, has conducted the country to its present happiness and glory.”71
History of the United States provided Americans of the Jacksonian Era with a portrait of the republic as infused with divine purpose that left it impervious to the
vicissitudes of time. The polity mirrored in Bancroft’s history did not depend on the
civic virtue of its citizens nor on maintaining a medium level of commercial development. The nation was not precariously poised between the extremes of decadence and savagery; it was steaming, infallibly, toward the millennium. The
republic, Bancroft reassured his readers, could expand across the continent without
riding the wheel of fortune and sinking into the abyss of empire building. By the
time James Polk nominated Bancroft to be his secretary of the navy, the first volume
of History had gone through ten editions. 72
While Tyler could rely on an increasingly receptive cultural climate, he could also
point to a host of potential economic benefits in renewing the Jacksonian bid for
California and the far Southwest. By acquiring Texas, Southern planters would
monopolize the production of cotton while Northerners would acquire a vast new
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domestic market for manufactured goods. By acquiring California’s port s ,a ll regions
of the country could sell in the vast, untapped markets of Asia.73 To his first secretary of state, Daniel Webster, Tyler wrote, “Our course is too plainly before us to be
mistaken. We must look to the whole country and to the whole people.”74 However,
to acquire Mexico’s northern provinces for the whole nation, John Tyler first had to
refute the damning charge, buttressed by seething sectional animosities and an array
of cultural tensions, that acquiring Texas would destabilize the republic.
Tyler’s propaganda campaign for Texas was a fumbling dress rehearsal in comparison to the remarkably intense and coherent promotional blitz that peaked after
Texas had been annexed and the Polk administration was seeking public support for
acquiring the Far West, from New Mexico to Oregon. Tyler’s efforts to win public
support for his expansionist program began in earnest when Virginia’s Whig congressman, Thomas Gilmer, wrote an impassioned editorial endorsing annexation
for the Baltimore Republican and Argus on January 10, 1843.75 Gilmer’s article was
followed by a host of supportive editorials in leading Democratic papers such as the
St. Louis Enquirer, the New York Herald, the Daily Madisonian, and the Democratic
Review.76
By frequently eulogizing the destiny of Anglo-Americans, and denouncing the
incapacity of Mexicans, Tyler’s propagandists appealed to the cardinal tenets of
what became known as “manifest destiny.” For example,Gilmer’s letter condemned
opponents of annexation as lacking faith in the common destiny of the nation.
“These [patriotic] sentiments are already extinct,” Gilmer explained,“in that bosom
which does not kindle at the contemplation of our country’s unexampled prosperity and grandeur, as they are heralded by the dawning future.”
Declaring that “nations like individuals must live up to their destiny,” Gilmer
called on the nation to expand into Mexico’s northern territories. Because Mexico
lacked the civic capacity to either hold or develop its frontier lands, annexing
Mexican territories to the United States was warranted. Mexico, Gilmer explained,
was “destined for some time to continue in a state of civil chaos, giving no signs of
energy but occasional spasmodic convulsions.”77 In drawing his sharp antithesis
between the “destinies” of Mexico and the United States, Gilmer was appealing
explicitly to the nationalistic ethic that would triumph during Polk’s administration.
That Tyler’s propagandists proclaimed his expansionist program to be providentially sanctioned is hardly surprising. What is remarkable about their campaign is
the extent to which appeals to providential favor were blunted by the dynamic of
controversy over annexing Texas. In renewing Jackson’s bid for Texas, Tyler’s propagandists first had to meet the damning civic arguments against annexation that
Adams and others had been advancing since 1836. Tyler’s ideologues, however,
could never convincingly refute the charges advanced by their political foes. Unable
to redefine the terms of debate, they lost yet another round in the Jacksonian effort
to acquire Texas.
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With marked clumsiness, Tyler’s propagandists sought to disarm their opponents by inverting their central arguments. Tyler’s polemicists claimed that the
republic was not threatened by a Southern conspiracy to conquer Mexican territory.
Rather, the country was threatened by a conspiracy of abolitionists, working in
league with Great Britain, to transform Texas into a British protectorate and inspire
Southern slaves to rebellion. Secondly, they made the provocative counter-claim
that annexation would a ctually decrease slavery by “draining” the slave population
of the upper South. Both assertions were compelling to many voters and would be
resurrected during Polk’s bid for the Far West. Nevertheless, neither assertion could
take the sting out of Adams’s bullwhip or win sufficient support to pass Tyler’s
annexation treaty.
The notion that abolitionists were conspiring with Great Britain to abolish slavery in Texas originated with Duff Green, a wealthy Missouri land speculator. After
championing the cause of slaveowners during the Missouri controversy of 1819, he
had purchased the St. Louis Enquirer to promote Andrew Jackson’s presidential aspirations.78 A close friend of President Tyler, Green traveled to Great Britain in 1841
as a confidential executive agent with the ostensible purpose of discussing trade
issues. Soon, Green was sending inflammatory reports back to Tyler, John Calhoun,
and Secretary of State Upshir that British Prime Minister Peel was seeking to promote “rebellion and servile war in the South by purchasing and emancipating the
slaves of Texas.” The “monomaniacal ravings” of John Quincy Adams and the
“fanatical representations of the abolitionists” were p romoting the British plot by
keeping the American electorate divided over Texas and slavery.79 Green’s charges
were subsequently printed in Green’s the St. Louis Enquirer, as well as the New York
Herald, the Daily Madisonian, and numerous other regional and municipal
papers.80
Conceding that the republic was vulnerable to civic corruption, and not infallibly guided by providence, Green’s counter-conspiracy theory was soon being
exposed as fabrication by members of Tyler’s own administration. The American
minister to Britain, Edward Everett, brought one of Green’s letters to the attention
of the British foreign secretary, Lord Aberdeen, who informed Everett that it contained notions “too absurd and unfounded to need serious contradiction.”81 Tyler’s
minister to Mexico, Waddy Thompson, wrote in 1844 that he had “seen or heard
nothing to justify the suspicion that Great Britain has made the abolition of slavery
in Texas the condition of her interposition.”82 Debunked by Tyler’s own appointees,
the alleged plot to emancipate Texan slaves would be easily discredited by Tyler’s
abolitionist foes.
The second counter-assertion advanced by expansionists was that annexing
Texas would actually curtail slavery. After quietly circulating in the Democratic
press for several years,the claim acquired national prominence with the publication
of Robert Walker’s 1844 pamphlet, Letter on the Annexation of Texas. Walker wrote
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his influential epistle as a favor to President Tyler, a personal friend and former
Senate associate.83 First published in January 1844, Letter on the Annexation circulated during Senate debate over annexation in the spring of 1844 and was subsequently employed to legitimize Polk’s expansionist platform in the presidential
campaign of 1844.
A cunning polemicist, who played a pivotal role in nominating James Polk at the
Democratic nominating convention of 1844, Mississippi Senator Robert Walker
had been leading the proannexation faction in the Senate since 1836. Endorsing the
federal system as capable of infinite expansion, while calling for the annexation of
the entire western half of the continent, Letter on the Annexation of Texas did much
to p opularize the core tenets of manifest destiny during Polk’s administration. In
the context of Polk’s 1844 presidential campaign, Letter on the Annexation of Texas
endorsed Polk’s campaign pledge, which Walker himself authored, to “reannex”
both Oregon and Texas. The pamphlet was so central to Polk’s election that the editor of the Democratic Review described it as the “text book” of the party in the presidential campaign. 84
During the last year of Tyler’s presidency, when the stasis of debate centered on
the annexation of Texas, the more salient aspect of Walker’s Letter was its “safety
valve thesis.” As the slave-holding states emancipated increasing numbers of slaves,
Walker argued, they would be “diffused” into Mexico and Central America, “where
nine-tenths of their present population are already of the colored races, and where
they are not a degraded caste but upon a footing of actual equality with the rest of
the population.”85 Seeking to make annexation palatable to voters who wanted to
expand market opportunities while curtailing slavery, Walker’s “safety valve thesis”
was infused with the righteous ethos of an abolitionist tract written by Benjamin
Lundy.
Widely endorsed in editorials across the country, Walker’s thesis did appeal to
moderates who still hoped that slavery would die a natural death that would render
any federal action concerning slavery unnecessary.86 However, Walker’s claim was
contradicted by the South’s growing economic dependency on slavery. To many
thinking people, Walker’s thesis was simply implausible. As one Alabama senator put
it, “The idea of slavery going off by a sort of insensible evaporation into the great
desert between Texas and Mexico is, to say the least, preposterous.”87 Moreover,
Walker’s “thesis” implicitly conceded that slavery was a social evil that threatened the
body politic: it did not meet Southerners’ growing ideological need to defend slavery
in positive terms. As Waddy Thompson explained in a letter published in the
National Intelligencer on July 6, 1844, “I confess for myself that it will afford me very
little consolation in riding over my fields, grown up in broom-sedge and washed into
gullies, to be told that slavery still exists and is prosperous in Texas.”88
Both Walker’s “safety valve thesis” and Green’s “counter-conspiracy theory”
would be taken up by expansionists in later polemical battles. Nevertheless, during
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the debate over Tyler’s annexation treaty in the spring of 1844, neither argument
had sufficient appeal to overcome the charges being made by Tyler’s foes, or to garner the necessary support for the annexation treaty that Tyler’s last secretary of
state, John Calhoun, submitted to the Senate on April 12, 1844.89

THE OPPOSITION FIGHTS BACK
Emboldened by Adams’s audacity in Congress, and moving with the momentum of
earlier victories, the opposition mobilized against Tyler’s renewed bid for Texas. In
Congress, and throughout the Whig and abolitionist press, Tyler’s counter-charges
were easily exposed as subterfuge. Deflating Tyler’s counter-arguments, opponents
reasserted their Spartan claim that seizing Mexico’s northern provinces to expand
slavery would set the United States on a course of empire-building. Not since the
Anti-Federalist opposition to the Constitution had a Montesqieuian prescription for
preserving the republic been championed so conspicuously in a debate of national
import.
Echoing Lord Aberdeen, most opponents derided expansionists for suggesting that
Texans, having won independence from Mexico, were now prepared to become the
stooges of Britain. On April 13, 1842, Henry Wise inaugurated Tyler’s campaign in the
House with a fervid appeal for annexation as the sole alternative to either England
colonizing Texas, or Texas conquering Mexico.90 In responding to Wise’s speech, John
Quincy Adams exclaimed, “I am inclined to consider all this rather as approaching to
what is sometimes called rhomdomontade.” To prick Wise’s ire, he added, “I look forward to the time when, in the records of history, the gentleman’s [Wise’s] name shall
be place side by side, not with the names Ghengis Khan or Tamerlane, but with that
of a still more glorious conqueror by the name of TOM THUMB.”91 Adams could dismiss Wise’s warning of British intrigue with blunt ridicule.
Lampooning the notion of Texas becoming a British protectorate, opponents
also disputed the claim that annexation could diminish slavery. For example, in a
sermon published by the Abolitionist Society, Unitarian minister James Clarke
pointed out that Walker’s claim was more image than argument. “As slavery happens to be not a fluid but an institution,” Clarke stated, “we do not see how
strengthening its foundations in Texas is to make it ‘disappear into Mexico.’“92 Little
effort was required to question the plausibility of Walker’s “safety-valve thesis.”
Casting doubt on Tyler’s counter-claims, opponents vigorously reestablished their
own Spartan case against appropriating Mexico’s northern territories. Throughout
the last year of Tyler’s administration, Whig and abolitionist papers overflowed with
sermons, articles,essays, and speeches reiterating the familiar civic argument against
annexation that Lundy and Adams had begun broadcasting in 1836.
Most polemicists doubted the civic capacities of Mexicans even as they defended
Mexico’s sovereignty over the Southwest. In a series of articles originally published
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in the New York Evening Post, Theodore Sedgwick expressed the same anti-Mexican
sentiment that countless newspapers had conveyed in reporting news of the Texan
War for Independence. That war, Sedgwick commented, had been particularly
remarkable for the “mingled imbecility and ferocity of the Mexicans.”
While he stereotyped Mexicans as barbaric, Sedgwick nevertheless called on the
United States to promote Mexico’s political stability rather than conquer her territories. “The annexation of Texas,” Sedgwick wrote, “instead of strengthening the
Union, weakens it, just so far as it adds a great line of frontier to be occupied and
defended.A friendly or neutral republic on our border is of vastly more importance
to us in every military point of view.”93
Indeed, Sedgwick warned that conquered Mexican territories would propel the
United States into the same abyss of civic anarchy that plagued Mexico and other
former Spanish colonies. “Justice not merely to ourselves but to all mankind is
essential to a republican form of government,” Sedgwick explained. “Change the
scene; breathe a spirit of violence, injustice, aggression and contempt of right, and
your social family becomes a horde of banditti—this Union sinks to the level of the
cut-throat republics of South America, and perishes amidst the scorn and execrations of mankind.”94 To preserve its own civic integrity, the United States had to
respect the sovereignty of the Mexican Republic.
Throughout the opposition literature, Mexico emerged repeatedly as an emblem
of civic liberty threatened by the encroaching slaveocracy. The page of one typical
abolitionist pamphlet, The Legion of Liberty! and Force of Truth! (December 1843),
announced that the American Anti-Slavery Society had resolved “that we regard the
project of annexing Texas to these United States . . . as unjust and perfidious to
Mexico and to this country, and equivalent, if accomplished, to a dissolution of the
Union.” Above these small, closely spaced words hovered an imposing image of the
Mexican Eagle holding a writhing snake in its beak. An accompanying caption
explained, “THE FREE EAGLE OF MEXICO GRAPPLING THE COLD BLOODED
VIPER, TYRANNY OR TEXAS”95
As proannexation propagandists like Walker and Gilmore sought to vilify
Mexico, so their opponents defended Mexico—where slavery was banned—as
incontestably civilized. In a typical speech, the pugnacious Kentucky abolitionist
Cassius Clay exclaimed,“I protest against this appeal to our sympathies in behalf of
Texas,and these unjust denunciations of Mexico.” The Mexican people, Clay stated,
were “inspired by that declaration of American Independence which recreant Texas
had renounced.” In 1821, Mexico had won independence from Spain; in 1824, constitutional government had been established; in 1829, “this much abused Mexico”
had outlawed slavery. Clay insisted that annexing the land of a neighboring republic infused with America’s revolutionary ideals would give Mexico claim to “the universal sympathy and aid of all nations.” Overlooking the fact that Texas had seceded
from Mexico in 1836 and won its independence, Clay asserted that annexation
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would violate Mexico’s sovereignty, corrupt the federal Constitution, and dissol ve
the republic of the United States.96
In claiming that annexation of Mexican territory would dissolve the Union, the
opponents of annexation were asserting that new slave states would exacerbate the
sectional conflict between North and South. Condemning slavery as intrinsically
abhorrent, they were also claiming that the republic could not expand beyond its
capacity to reconcile internal conflicts or repel foreign enemies. “It is not territory
that we want,” Cassius Clay explained in the same sp eech quoted above. “Our wide
unoccupied domain stretches from the Mississippi to the far Pacific: we have
already more land than we are able to defend from savage incursion and British
usurpation.” Revealing why the republic could not tolerate the annexation of Texas,
Theodore Sedgwick stated,“interests and prejudices necessarily increase with every
extension of territory, and it is in this light that every great augmentation of the
Union becomes formidable.”97
Defending Mexico’s sovereignty over the West, opponents regularly sounded the
Spartan warning against excessive territorial expansion. “A union resting as one terminus on the Pacific Ocean, as another on Mexico, as a third on N. Brunswick and
the Atlantic, could not be held together for six months,” declared an anonymous
author in the Richmond Whig. “It would crumble to pieces by its own weight and
overwhelm all in its ruins.”“Our country is quite large enough now,” another wrote
in the New York Tribune, deeming it “incredible that any sane man should favor the
annexation of Texas.”98
In opposing Tyler’s campaign for Texas, John Quincy Adams reached the apogee
of his own transmogrification into a Spartan opponent of Jacksonian expansion.
Continuing to speak out against annexation with the same arguments he had been
making since 1836, Adams submitted a proposal to the Committee of Foreign
Affairs in September 1843 that dramatized how completely his stance had changed
since the days of his ardent expansionism. The Congress, Adams proposed, should
declare “that any attempt by act of Congress or by treaty to annex Texas would be a
violation of the Constitution, null and void, to which the free states of the Union
and their people ought not to submit.”99 Although Adams’s proposal died in committee, the Massachusetts legislature took up his call with a widely published resolution that the people of that commonwealth would regard the annexation of Texas
as “dangerous to its continuance in peace, in prosperity, and in the enjoyment of
those blessings which it is the object of a free government to secure.”100 Publicly
endorsing Adams’s stance, the Massachusetts state legislature offered itself as a final
rampart against a central government that would become despotic, ipso fa cto, by
annexing territories still claimed by the sovereign nation of Mexico.
By February 1843, Adams was preparing a definitive statement on the annexation
of Texas. “I wish to leave behind me,” Adams wrote in his diary as he was preparing
his manifesto for publication, “something which may keep alive the flame of liberty
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and preserve it in that conflict between slavery and freedom which is drawing to its
crisis.”101 As a final means of thwarting the annexation of Texas, the seventy-fouryear-old former president was ready to publicly urge the Northern states to secede.
Printed in the National Intelligencer on May 4, 1843, and reprinted in Niles
Register on May 13, 1843, Adam’s “Address to the people of the free states of the
Union” entreated its readers to lobby against the seizure of Mexican land as a last
means of preserving the Union. Annexation, Adams warned emphatically, would
compel the North to secede from the slave states. “We hesitate not to say,” Adams
asseverated, “that annexation, effected by any act or proceeding of the Federal
Government, or any of its Departments, WOULD BE IDENTICAL WITH DISSOLUTION.” By utterly violating the fundamental principles of the Constitution,
annexation would “fully justify” the dissolution of the Union.102
Adams had devoted his career to expanding the Union and defending the federal
Constitution. Now, in calling on the Northern states to prepare for secession, he was
implicitly drawing on the same states’ rights principles that Southern fire-eaters were
using to justify Southern secession as a ultimate means of protecting slavery. Rather
than making a serious policy proposal, Adams was provocatively raising the rhetorical stakes: He was matching the loud threats being made by Southern secessionists
to pull the Southern states out of the Union if Congress did not annex Texas.103

THE DEFEAT OF CALHOUN’S TREATY OF ANNEXATION
On April 27, 1844, the New York Evening Post published the treaty of annexation,
with its supporting documentation, that Secretary of State John Calhoun had completed secretly with Texan officials and submitted to the Senate on April 12,1844.104
The damning materials, leaked to the Evening Post by B enjamin Tappan, an antislavery senator from Ohio, brought the national debate over annexation to its climax. When the Senate finally rejected the treaty in June 1844,moderates in both the
Whig and Democratic parties had embraced Adams’s assertion that seizing Mexican
lands to expand slavery would, indeed, wreck the republic.
Unlike the ideologues who would justify President Polk’s expansionist program,
Calhoun never portrayed the annexation of Texas as fulfilling providential destiny.
Rather, he drew explicitly on Green’s counter-conspiracy theory. Annexation,
Calhoun declared, was necessary to protect the South’s “peculiar institution” from
British intrigue and from radical abolitionists. Calhoun was brazenly justifying the
annexation of Texas on sectional rather than national grounds: To promote his own
states’ rights agenda, he was forcing moderates in both parties to reveal whether
they could be counted on to support Southern interests.105
Calhoun made his most emphatic defense of annexation in two letters addressed
to British Minister Pakenham that were included among the documents published
in the New York Post. In these letters, Calhoun argued that annexing Texas would
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prevent Britain from emancipating slaves in Texas and fomenting a servile rebellion
in the slave states. Calhoun explained that it was not possible “for the President to
hear with indifference the avowal of a policy so hostile in its character and dangerous in its tendency, to the domestic institutions of so many States of this Union,and
to the safety and prosperity of the whole.”106
Echoing Green’s contrived assertions, Calhoun also defended his treaty by making an emphatic defense of slavery that blatantly contradicted Walker’s claim that
annexation would help “diffuse” it into Mexico. Relying on data from the census of
1840, Calhoun asserted that where slaves had been emancipated, they had “invariably sunk into vice and pauperism accompanied by the bodily and mental afflictions incident thereto—deafness, blindness, insanity, and idiocy, to a degree
without example.” Where slavery existed, blacks had “improved greatly in every
respect, in number, comfort, intelligence and morals.”107 Failure to protect
Southern slavery, Calhoun insisted, “would involve in the greatest calamity the
whole country and especially the race which it is the avowed object of her exertions
to benefit.”108 Nobody reading Calhoun’s arguments for annexation in the Evening
Post could doubt that he sought Texas, and adjoining Mexican territories, to protect
and expand the South’s “peculiar institution.”
On the same day that Calhoun’s stunning letters appeared in the Evening Post,
the leading Whig and Democratic presidential candidates, Henry Clay and Martin
Van Buren, publicly denounced Calhoun’s treaty. Each feared that supporting
Calhoun’s treaty would undermine the broad national support their respective
campaigns would need to win the presidency.109 In rejecting the treaty, both men
echoed the same civic arguments that Adams, and other opponents of annexation
had been voicing for eight years.
“Annexation and war with Mexico are identical,” Henry Clay asserted in his
famous “Raleigh Letter,” first published in the National Intelligencer on April 27,
1844.“I consider the annexation of Texas, at this time, without the assent of Mexico,
as a measure compromising the national character, involving us certainly in war
with Mexico, and dangerous to the integrity of the Union. . . .”110 Later clarifying his
position, Clay invoked the same Spartan ethos others had adopted in opposing
annexation.“I think it better to harmonize what we have,” Clay explained, “than to
introduce a new element of discord into our political partnership, against the consent of existing members of the concern.”111 Having led the effort to acquire Texas
back in 1820, Clay was now sounding like a sage Massachusetts statesman who had
recently re-read Montesqieu’s Spirit of the Law.
Like Clay, Van Buren employed familiar civic arguments in condemning
Calhoun’s annexation treaty. “We have a character among the nations of the earth
to maintain,” Van Buren announced in explaining his opposition to Calhoun’s
treaty. While “the lust for power”had led other countries down the path of conquest
and aggrandizement, “our movements in these respects have always been regulated
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by reason and justice.”112 Van Buren had never actively supported the annexation of
Texas. Now, as a presidential candidate, he was condemning Calhoun’s treaty with
a Spartan admonition to avoid the calamitous path of empire building.
Though both presidential candidates issued subsequent qualifications that complicated their positions, Clay and Van Buren initially condemned Calhoun’s treaty
of annexation with the same arguments that opponents of annexation had been
advancing for years. In doing so, both men poisoned their bids for the presidency
in the election of 1844.

THE ELECTION

OF

JAMES POLK AND

THE

TRIUMPH OF MANIFEST DESTINY

On June 9, 1844, the eve of adjournment, Congress overwhelmingly rejected
Calhoun’s treaty by a vote of 16 to 35. Every Whig in the Senate, except f or John
Henderson of Mississippi, opposed. Seven Van Buren Democrats, along with
Missourian Thomas Benton, also opposed.113 Adams and his allies, aided by John
Calhoun, had derailed Tyler’s bid for Texas.
The aging Massachusetts congressman expressed his gratitude writing,
I record this vote as a deliverance,I trust, by the special interposition of Almighty God,
of my country and o f human liberty from a conspiracy comparable to that of Lucius
Sergius Catilina. May it prove not a mere temporary deliverance, like that, only preliminary to the fatally successful conspiracy of Julius Caesar! The annexation of Texas
to this union is the first step to the conquest of all Mexico, the West India Islands, of a
maritime, colonizing, slave-tainted monarchy, and of extinguished freedom.114

Adams had every reason to feel triumphant: he had participated in an extraordinary
polemical victory. Yet his apprehensions were equally well justified: the imperatives
of market expansion, intertwined with deepening sectional r ivalry, were creating
overwhelming political pressure to expand across the entire continent. The finger
that Adams and his allies had placed in the dike could not hold back the flood
waters much longer. Their dilemma can be illuminated by comparing the
Montesqieuian opposition to Texas in the 1830s with the Anti-Federalists resistance
to the Federal Constitution in 1787.
In 1787,the Anti-Federalists had appealed to the Montesqieuian extremity of the
republican tradition. They opposed the new Federal Constitution with the classical
assertion that a republic was only viable if it remained territorially contained.
Appealing to impeccable republican doctrine, they righteously opposed; yet they
could only propose the continuation of a politically fragmented and economically
constrictive governmental framework. Their arguments carried all the civic righteousness of the revolutionary tradition, but remained static, and did not speak to
the imperatives of national economic development.
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Likewise, Adams, along with his Whig and abolitionist colleagues, could claim
the moral high ground with his own Spartan opposition to Jacksonian expansion.
They pointed convincingly to the fraying bonds between North and South in asserting that internal divisions increased as the republic expanded outward. But while
they could block annexation by hurling thunderbolts of righteousness at their hapless foes, they could only propose a vision of the republic that had already been
inadequate in 1787. While parts of the Anti-Federalist tradition had been appropriated by Southern states’ rights theorists, the Spartan ethic had b een superannuated
by the market system, created by the federal Constitution, that was pushing the
country westward in the 1840s. The high-toned opponents of annexation offered
little to the hard-bitten immigrants who were finding their way into the Eastern
cities from the bowels of the old European empires. Their arguments could not
replenish the accounts of farmers ruined in the Panic of 1837.
Significantly, the Anti-Federalists initiated their polemical campaign when political deliberation was still largely restricted to properly educated and connected gentlemen who identified with specific regional communities rather than with national
political parties.115 While the revolution had begun to collapse the hierarchical
nature of colonial society, key actors in the controversy were drawn from a geographically diverse but relatively homogenous elite who were deliberating how to
restructure the institutional foundations of the republic.116 Compared with later
national disputes, the debate between Federalists and Anti-Federalists was conducted at an astonishingly high level of intellectual sophistication: In the context of
1787, The Federalist Papers were polemics, calculated to sway delegates in the New
York ratifying convention.117 Today, they are collectively considered a classic statement of American political philosophy.
By 1844, politics had become mass politics,structured by the reductive ideological polarities promoted by the new, fully entrenched, two-party system.
Increasingly, political differences during the Jacksonian era were expressed in simplified alternatives that were conducive to mass persuasion. By 1844, the “Spartan”
argument against annexation was not a serious statement of political philosophy
but a polemical weapon wielded in party warfare. In the electric moment of enunciation, the “Spartan” argument was sincerely expressed and gave audiences serious
cause for reflection. Nevertheless, it was advanced in the context of party strife; it
was an extension of the Whigs’ effort to figuratively project themselves as the true
defenders of the Revolution. And by 1844, the potential economic benefits of
expansion were beginning to outweigh the danger that annexation would precipitate civic ruin.
Even as Calhoun’s treaty was going down in defeat, a new coalition of Northern
and Southern expansionists had congealed at the Democratic Presidential
Nominating Convention in Baltimore. They had already orchestrated Polk’s nomination when the Senate rejected Calhoun’s treaty in June 1844. They were dusting
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off the compelling arguments made by the “Pubulius” authors of The Federalist
Papers that the republic was enhanced by territorial expansion. They were repolishing Adams’ old nationalistic faith that the new nation—the new city on the hill—
was not bound by the turning wheel of fortune. Finally, they would obliterate the
Montesquieuian argument that had blocked the acquisition of Texas for nine years.
How Texas was annexed, and what then ensued, are fixtures of antebellum history. Van Buren was replaced with the avowed expansionist, James Polk, at the 1844
Democratic nominating convention. With a mere 1.4 percent lead in the popular
vote, Polk won the election vowing to “reannex Texas and reoccupy Oregon.”
Considering Polk’s election a mandate to annex the Lone Star Republic, the reconvened 28th Congress began reconsidering annexation at the beginning of January
1845. An impasse over competing annexation resolutions was finally broken aft er
two months of debate when Robert Walker offered a compromise bill that passed
the Senate by a mere two votes. The war with Mexico that broke out thirteen
months later, along with the gigantic territorial gains formalized in the 1848 Treaty
of Guadalupe Hildalgo, were all justified with the exalted tenets of manifest destiny.
While students of antebellum history have illuminated many aspects of manifest
destiny, one dimension has not been sufficiently appreciated: The theologized ideology of expansion that crystallized during Polk’s administration emerged in dialectical opposition to the Montesquieuian argument that had impeded annexation for
nine years. Jacksonian ideologues saturated the culture with the transcendent tenets
of manifest destiny between 1844 and 1846 as a way of tranquilizing the apprehension, massaged so effectively by opponents since 1836, that annexing Texas would
undermine the vulnerable foundations of the republic.
Opponents of annexation, of course, were not the only polemicists of the period
who were warning of impending social ruin. Antebellum America as a whole was
enduring wrenching dislocations that were sparking widespread social anxieties.
The growing concentration of wealth, efforts to organize propertyless workers, and
an increasingly xenophobic fear of Catholics testified to the social anxieties of the
period, as did the banning of federal mail in the South, the mobbing of abolitionists in the North, and the shrill exhortations voiced by Conscience Whigs and abolitionist orators. Across the entire political spectrum, polemicists were voicing fears
of social collapse. John Tyler had been as apprehensive of industrialization and
British commercial p ower as Benjamin Lundy was of the slaveocracy bending the
republic into an empire.118 The theologized ethic of manifest destiny was an ideological tonic for the whole range of seething anxieties that infused antebellum
America. As Karen Armstrong points out in her History of God, “Calvinist theologies of election have been largely instrumental in encouraging Americans to believe
that they are God’s own nation. As in Josiah’s Kingdom of Judah, such a belief is
likely to flourish at a time of political insecurity when people are haunted by the
fear of their own destruction.”119
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While opponents of annexation had not caused the anxieties felt by antebellum
Americans, they had legitimized fears of social collapse by resurrecting the idea,
popular in the late eighteenth century, that the republic was a corporal network of
human relationships, vulnerable to the ravages of time and human folly, that would
implode if its vital institutional balances were upset. Manifest destiny became a
national ideology by neutralizing the unsettling vision of society that opponents
had used to dominate the debate over annexing Texas until the election of James
Polk in 1844.
Becoming a chorus during the presidential campaign of 1844, the editorials,
speeches, and articles that called on the country to fulfill its “manifest destiny”
reached a crescendo in the spring of 1846, as Zachary Taylor’s army was encamped
on the eastern side of the Rio Grande opposite the Mexican town of Matamoros.
The sustained propaganda blitz that continued until the declaration of war on May
13, 1846, was like a giant shower of confetti shredded from the pages of Bancroft’s
History of the United States.120
Seeking to build broad national support for Polk’s expansionist policies, appeals
to manifest destiny were sounded in Democratic papers across the country. The
greatest cacophony came from the Democratic papers of New York, which included
John O’Sullivan’s the New York Morning News and Democratic Review, James
Bennett’s New York Herald, and Moses Y. Beach’s the New York Sun. Repeatedly,
these and other papers echoed the distinct national vision of futurity that Bancroft
had evoked in History of the United States. Echoing the same appeal made by papers
across the country, the New York Herald announced on July 2, 1845, “The flight of
the eagle is toward the West, and there it is he spreads his wings for freedom.” On
October 10,1845,the St. Louis Missourian reported that the American people would
merely be displaying “great political sagacity, and carrying out a decree of the
Almighty in acquiring any territory from Mexico.” Lifting the motto off the spine of
Bancroft’s History, the New York Sun declared on May 19,1845, “WESTWARD! THE
STAR OF EMPIRE TAKES ITS WAY.”
In writing the editorial that gave birth to the term, “manifest destiny,” John
O’Sullivan was himself simply extrapolating the central theme of Bancroft’s history.
“By the right of our manifest destiny,” O’Sullivan wrote in the New York Morning News
on December 27, 1845, the United States was entitled to “overspread and to possess
the whole of the continent which Providence had given us for the development of the
great experiment of liberty and federative self-government entrusted to us.”121 In proclaiming that the historical development of the nation was inevitable, and not subject
to temporal constraints, O’Sullivan, Bennett, and so many others who popularized
the core premise of manifest destiny, drew upon the theologized conception of the
republic that George Bancroft had popularized in History of the United States.
Implicitly, the absolutist creed of manifest destiny mollified fears that the viability of the republic was contingent and therefore threatened by annexation. Claims
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that providence guaranteed the propriety of expanding across the continent were
declarations of self-evident faith. They constituted grounds for argument but did
not themselves require argumentative demonstration.122 The creed of manifest destiny was reducible to rhetorically self-sustaining political slogans that required simple repetition to soothe the secular fears that opponents had been stoking for nine
years. Through sheer repetition,faith was solidified;anxiety was mollified; certainty
was hardened.
Sometimes, Jacksonian ideologues did explicitly refer to the opponents of expansion who had maintained the rhetorical upper hand until Polk’s election in 1844.
The “pioneers of Anglo-Saxon civilization now seek distant territories, stretching
even to the shores of the Pacific,” declared the New York Herald on September 25,
1845. They were no longer “bounded by those limits which nature had in the eye of
those of little faith [in] the last generation.”123 The phrase “Men of little faith” had
been used to disparage Anti-Federalists in the 1780s.124 Now, the phrase referred to
those who rejected Bancroft’s theologized republicanism. They were citizens still
swayed by the classical notion that a republic could not expand beyond finite limits and was sustained by the fallible conduct of citizens rather than the infallible
power of God. The “men of little faith” still heeded the old Spartan warning that the
yeoman republic could become a debauched empire.
With his historical themes trumpeted in newspapers and magazines across the
country, George Bancroft assumed full stature as the high priest of manifest destiny
when he stepped up to the podium on the east portico of the Capitol in August 1845
to deliver Andrew Jackson’s funeral oration. After reviewing Jackson’s career,
Bancroft venerated Jackson as a God who would bless the movement of “cultivated
man” to the Rio Grande and the Pacific. As “Old Hickory” had pacified the old
Southwest,so his spirit would now sanctify the expansion that “Young Hickory”was
beginning to consummate in 1845. Concluding his oration, Bancroft declared, “his
spirit rests upon our whole territory; it hovers over the vales of Oregon, and guards,
in advance the frontier of the Del Norte.”125 Portraying Polk’s expansionist program
as an extension of Jackson’s accomplishments, the high priest of manifest destiny
deified both presidents as agents of the national destiny that Bancroft was himself
helping to orchestrate.
When news arrived in May 1846 that a Mexican force had crossed the Rio
Grande and ambushed two companies of dragoons, Polk, assisted by Bancroft,
finalized his already prepared war message. Presuming that Mexico’s northern
provinces already belonged to the United States,the declaration stated that “Mexico
has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory and shed
American blood upon American soil.”126
George Bancroft, Robert Walker, and other ideologues in the popular press had
decisively defeated the civic arguments that opponents of annexation had wielded
successfully for nine years. When both houses approved a war bill by overwhelming
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majorities on May 13, euphoric rallies of support were held across the country.
Owing to the number of volunteers, recruiting centers in many towns made their
selection by lot.127 From Lansingburgh, New York, Herman Melville wrote that “people here are all in a state of delirium. . . . A military ardor pervades all ranks. . . .
Nothing is talked of but the ‘Halls of the Montezumas.’“128
Amid the national euphoria, few remembered the Spartan warnings against
expansion that had dominated the national debate over territorial expansion until
the summer of 1844. Citizens across the country had embraced Bancroft’s faith that
the continued progress of the American republic was assured by the unerring, and
thereby divine, force that had activated American history from its beginning.
Manifest destiny provided a theologized image of the nation that was far more
reassuring to anxious Americans than the secular conception of society that o pponents of annexation had been forcefully articulating since 1836. Soothing the myriad social fears that afflict antebellum Americans, manifest destiny emerged as a
national ideology by overshadowing the Montesquieuian argument, advanced since
the Monroe Administration, that adding Texas to the Union would undermine the
vulnerable foundations of the republic.
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